Positive Affect Facilitates the Effect of a Warning on False Memory in the DRM Paradigm by YANG, Hwajin et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
3-2015
Positive Affect Facilitates the Effect of a Warning on
False Memory in the DRM Paradigm
Hwajin YANG
Singapore Management University, hjyang@smu.edu.sg
Sujin YANG
Stephen J. CECI
Cornell University
Alice M. ISEN
Cornell University
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2014.950177
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Social Psychology Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
YANG, Hwajin, YANG, Sujin, CECI, Stephen J., & ISEN, Alice M..(2015). Positive Affect Facilitates the Effect of a Warning on False
Memory in the DRM Paradigm. Journal of Positive Psychology, 10(3), 196-206.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1564
 1 
Positive affect facilitates the effect of a warning on false memory in the DRM paradigm 
Hwajin Yanga*, Sujin Yanga, Stephen J. Cecib and Alice M. Isenc 
aSchool of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Rd., Singapore, Singapore  
(corresponding author email: hjyang@smu.edu.sg;  
 bHuman Development, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA;  cDepartment of Psychology and Johnson Graduate School of 
Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA 
Increasing evidence that positive affect enhances associative processing has lent weight to the idea that positive 
affect increases false memory for information that is thematically interrelated. Using the Deese–Roediger–
McDermott paradigm, we examined whether mild positive affect facilitates monitoring processes in modulating 
false memory for associate words. When participants in the warned condition – in contrast to those in the 
unwarned condition – were overtly warned about possible false recognition of the critical lure, we found that 
positive affect, compared to neutral affect, significantly enhanced monitoring through a warning and reduced 
false recognition. Signal detection analyses suggest that when a warning is provided, positive affect enhances 
sensitivity to discriminate list items from critical lures, but it does not shift the overall decision criterion. Taken 
together, we conclude that positive affect facilitates the effect of a warning in reducing false memories for 
semantic associates.  
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False memory refers to the recollection of an event – 
or the details of an event – that did not occur (Loftus, 
1997). These memory errors reflect the operation of 
associative memory processes, which take place in an 
existing relationship between a stimulus and a 
response (for a review, see Gutchess & Schacter, 
2012). Given that positive affect promotes associative 
processing (for a review, see Isen, Daubman, & 
Nowici, 1987), the question arises whether mild 
positive affect gives rise to false memory. A vast body 
of empirical evidence suggests that mild positive 
affect, induced through humor or a small gift, 
enhances broad associative activation through 
effective access to, and integration of, extensive 
cognitive material (e.g. Mackie & Worth, 1989). 
Moreover, the affect-as-information (AAI) theory 
(e.g. Schwarz, 1990) also postulates that positive 
affect signals that the environment is safe, and 
therefore promotes heuristic and gist-based (i.e. 
relational) processing. These views have led to the 
idea that positive affect is likely to create false 
memory when remembering multiple concepts that 
are thematically related because positive affect 
promotes the gist-based representation of 
semantically related concepts. Consistent with this 
idea, Bless et al. (1996) have demonstrated that 
induced positive affect, compared to negative affect, 
increases false recognition (i.e. memory intrusion) of 
typical information not presented in the script of an 
everyday situation (e.g. going out for dinner). They 
contend that positive affect increases false memory by 
facilitating reliance on well-learned general 
knowledge structures, such as scripts and routines 
(schemata), which allow simplified and efficient 
processing by freeing up processing resources – but at 
the expense of rendering processing more error prone.  
Despite these assumptions about a link between 
positive affect and heuristic and gist-based 
processing, there are three classes of challenges to the 
contention that positive affect promotes memory 
errors in learning prototypical or semantically related 
concepts. First, the assumption that positive affect 
induces reliance on general knowledge is at odds with 
evidence that positive affect enhances originality and 
innovative thinking (Isen, 2000).1 The originality and 
innovation observed in people in positive mood is 
likely achieved by less reliance on well-learned, 
typical ways of thinking, as opposed to the greater 
reliance posited by Bless et al. (1996). This is because 
schema-based knowledge tends to routinize thinking 
and impedes access to unusual cognitive material 
(Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007). Second, reliance 
on schemata is considered disadvantageous in more 
complicated domains (e.g. creative problem solving, 
negotiation, and decision-making), in which focusing 
on atypical details can be important (Rowe et al., 
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2007). At the same time, however, several studies 
have demonstrated the beneficial effects of positive 
affect on such processes (e.g. Breslin & Safer, 2011; 
Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Staw & Barsade, 1993). And 
third, any processing resources allegedly freed up by 
positive affect could be used for activities other than 
inferential processing, such as greater contextual 
encoding, item-specific rehearsal, retrieval tagging, 
and monitoring – all of which be expected to decrease, 
not increase, false memory. For these reasons, the 
claim that positive affect increases false memory 
warrants further research.  
False memory in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott 
paradigm  
Because no clear link has been established between 
positive affect and false memory, our understanding 
is still poor. We set out to investigate the association, 
if any, by using the well-known Deese–Roediger–
McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995), which allows for greater 
control over affective valence without raising doubts 
about the validity of recall of naturalistic events. In the 
DRM paradigm, participants are presented with 
multiple lists of semantic associates (for example, 
‘snow,’ ‘winter,’ ‘ice,’ and so on) that are related to a 
non-presented critical item (in this case, ‘cold’). 
Typically, participants erroneously endorse the 
critical lure as frequently as the studied word (see 
Roediger, McDermott, & Robinson, 1998, for a 
review).  
Several theoretical accounts have been advanced 
to explain the phenomenon of false memory. The 
spreading- activation theory posits that false memory 
occurs when critical items are automatically activated 
due to the excitation of related nodes within a 
semantic network (Collins & Loftus, 1975). The 
activation-monitoring theory postulates that the 
activation process triggers false memory by spreading 
activation to related lures, but subsequent monitoring 
processes play a role in determining false memories 
(Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). 
Similarly, the fuzzy-trace theory posits that false 
memory occurs when participants favor gist-based 
representation, while verbatim-based (i.e. specific 
properties of stimuli) retrieval, in response to a lure, 
may attenuate false memories.  
Using the DRM paradigm, Storbeck and Clore 
(2005, 2011) first found that negative affect, 
compared to both positive affect and the control 
condition, reduces false memory by promoting item-
specific processing – that is, processing the properties 
of individual items not shared with other items; this is 
especially evident during encoding. It should be 
noted, however, that in both of Storbeck and Clore’s 
studies, the positive-affect group did not differ from 
the control group in false memory. These findings 
contradict the prevailing idea that positive affect 
promotes false memory because of its facilitating role 
in associative processing and gist-based heuristics. 
They also offer two important suggestions. The first is 
that any process responsible for the difference 
between the positive and negative affect condition 
should be more appropriately attributed to negative 
affect than positive affect. Second, the finding that 
positive affect does not enhance false memory – 
compared to neutral affect – suggests the possibility 
that positive affect may influence other counteractive 
processes such as monitoring, which may offset the 
tendency to increase false memory. We further 
explain below why we believe that monitoring may 
serve as a potential counteractive process that would 
influence the previously proposed relationship 
between positive affect and false memory.  
Positive affect and the monitoring process  
Our study’s aim was to determine whether positive 
affect modulates false memories through improved 
monitoring, which can potentially override any 
setback that results from activating the critical item 
during encoding processing. One way to study the 
effects of positive affect on spontaneous monitoring is 
to use explicit warnings about the false-memory 
phenomenon (i.e. memory intrusion of the critical 
item). Research using the DRM paradigm has 
indicated that a warning about the false-memory 
effect given before the study significantly reduces 
false memory by enabling participants to monitor and 
identify the critical item during presentation of the 
study lists; this is known to be the most effective 
strategy to reduce false memory (Gallo, Roediger, & 
McDermott, 2001; McCabe & Smith, 2002). 
Therefore, if positive affect provides a more favorable 
condition – in which people are likely to engage in 
active and rigorous monitoring – positive affect 
should substantially reduce false memory through the 
promotion of monitoring behavior (Rowe et al., 
2007).  
Some empirical evidence suggests the relation of 
positive affect to a set of higher order cognitive 
processes that are believed to be related to monitoring 
abilities. For instance, the literature on positive affect 
has suggested that it facilitates higher order controlled 
processes, such as cognitive set switching (e.g. Isen & 
Schmidt, 2007), working memory (Carpenter, Peters, 
Vastjfall, & Isen, 2013; Yang, Yang, & Isen, 2013), 
task switching (Yang & Yang, 2014), and attention 
deployment (Derryberry, 1993), all of which 
implicate controlled processing that can be employed 
to support careful monitoring in the DRM task. The 
importance of attentional control has consistently 
been highlighted in the DRM literature. For example, 
Peters et al. (2008) have demonstrated that 
manipulation of attentional control profoundly 
influences participants’ susceptibility to false 
memories in the DRM paradigm. They suggest that a 
breakdown in attentional control during encoding 
undermines monitoring vigilance, and thus leads to 
increased reliance on familiarity-based processes. 
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Similarly, Leding (2012) found that individuals with 
low working memory capacity experience greater 
false memories precisely because they are less able to 
engage in source monitoring. In light of these results, 
it is possible that either enhanced attentional control 
or working memory capacity, which improve in a 
positive affect state, can contribute by way of a 
warning to monitoring abilities that help suppress 
false memories (Gray, 2001; Yang et al., 2013).  
In our study, we hypothesized that if positive 
affect facilitates the effect of a warning, especially 
through improved (spontaneous) monitoring, it should 
also result in a greater decline in false memory than 
neutral affect because monitoring should help in 
identifying gist information, which is automatically 
activated during initial encoding. We manipulated a 
warning (warning vs. no warning), and participants in 
the warned group – in contrast to those in the 
unwarned condition – were twice told not to ‘fall prey’ 
to critical lures. This was accomplished through an 
overt warning about possible false recognition of the 
critical item. The warning was given before the study 
and again before retrieval (i.e. the recognition test).   
Method  
Participants  
Seventy-eight undergraduates (male = 25) from a 
northeastern US university participated in the study in 
exchange for extra credit. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions: warned-positive 
affect (n = 21), warned-neutral affect (n = 19), 
unwarned-positive affect (n = 20), and unwarned-
neutral affect (n = 18).  
Design  
The ITEM (semantically associated list items and 
non-presented critical lures) was manipulated within 
participants. AFFECT (positive and neutral) and 
WARNING (warning and no warning) were 
manipulated between participants.  
Materials  
Two affect manipulation checks were employed. The 
Remote Associates Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962) 
served as an unobtrusive manipulation check on 
induced positive affect immediately after induction, 
and a single-item explicit check was administered at 
the end of the study to ensure that the induced mood 
had remained effective until the end of the study.  
Despite the assumed effectiveness of an explicit 
manipulation check that asks participants to indicate 
the degree of their mood, following the gift with an 
obvious question about mood could cause participants 
to be suspicious of the experimenter’s intent in giving 
them the gift – which, in turn, could dispel the induced 
feeling state (Isen & Erez, 2007). Accordingly, it may 
be more appropriate to employ an implicit 
manipulation check. The RAT can be useful for such 
a purpose because (a) the literature has documented 
that mild positive affect improves performance on the 
RAT (for a review, see Isen, 2008) and (b) successful 
performance on the RAT is believed to rely on 
cognitive abilities such as verbal fluency, associative 
learning, and insightful problem solving (e.g. 
Ansburg & Hill, 2003; Wiley & Jarosz, 2012), all of 
which have been shown to improve under positive 
affect (for a review, see Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 
1999). We therefore expected that participants in the 
positive-affect condition would perform better on the 
RAT than those in the control condition.  
In the RAT, a person is required to think of a word 
in relation to each of three other words presented; for 
instance, cadet, capsule, and ship (answer: space). In 
all, 21 RAT items were taken from Bowden and Jung-
Beeman’s (2003) normative data. These items were 
selected on the basis of a difficulty score determined 
by the percentage of participants who solved a given 
item within 15 s. The average difficulty score was 
51%. This is optimal psychometrically because a 
score of 50% maximizes statistical power in detecting 
correlations.  
Eighteen lists of semantic associates were selected 
from the norms published by Stadler, Roediger, and 
McDermott (1999). The lists were divided into three 
sets; each contained six lists of semantic associates, 
with their normed false-recall rates matched (SET A 
= 74.6%, SET B = 75%, SET C = 74.8%). The lists 
within each set were counterbalanced to function in 
the recognition test as either list items, critical lures, 
or baseline items. Lists that were directly related to 
emotion (e.g. the ‘anger’ list) were excluded because 
the emotional content of stimuli influences the 
distribution of attention and controlled processing 
(Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). Each of these lists 
consisted of the top 12 ranked associates of a given 
critical item; for instance, ‘nose,’ ‘breathe,’ ‘sniff,’ 
‘aroma,’ ‘hear,’ ‘see,’ ‘nostril,’ ‘whiff,’ ‘scent,’ 
‘reek,’ ‘stench,’ ‘fragrance,’ (Critical item: smell). 
None of the critical items appeared in any of the study 
lists. The recognition test contained 72 items; 36 had 
been presented in the study phase and the remainder 
had not. The 36 studied items were sampled from 
serial positions – 1st, 8th, and 10th – on each of the 
studied lists. The remaining 36 nonpresented items 
included 12 critical items – one from each of the 
studied lists – and 24 new items from the baseline 
lists.  
Procedure  
Affect induction  
Positive affect was induced by giving participants a 
small bag of candy, attractively tied with a ribbon, as 
a token of appreciation for agreeing to participate. 
Participants were asked to put it away with their books 
and take it with them when they left the lab – i.e. no 
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participant ate the candy during the session. Previous 
studies have shown that this method can effectively 
induce mild 198 H. Yang et al. Downloaded by 
[Singapore Management University] at 21:31 09 April 
2016 positive affect sufficient to influence cognition 
in both students and professionals, such as physicians 
(e.g. Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1997). Participants in 
the neutral condition did not receive a gift and were 
unaware of its presence, as an instruction was given to 
each individual while they were in the separate 
reception room. Equivalent levels of interaction 
between participants and experimenter were ensured 
by following the same behavioral protocol (e.g. the 
same verbal expression of thanks).  
The RAT  
The RAT was then administered as an unobtrusive 
manipulation check. Participants were seated 
individually in front of a computer and wore 
headphones. Instructions for the RAT and two 
examples were presented on the computer screen, and 
participants were given a worksheet on which they 
were to answer as many items as they could within 3 
min. When the time elapsed, a beep went off in the 
headphone. The next phase was modeled after the 
DRM paradigm.  
The DRM paradigm  
Prior to the study phase, participants in the warned 
condition – in contrast to those in the unwarned 
condition – were explicitly warned about the false-
memory phenomenon and strongly encouraged to 
increase vigilant monitoring to avoid falsely encoding 
critical items. For each trial, the fixation signal 
appeared on the computer screen for 500 ms and the 
study item was presented for 1500 ms, followed by a 
blank screen for 1000 ms. As suggested by 
McDermott and Watson (2001), we chose this 
duration (3000 ms) because it was long enough for the 
participant to distinguish true memory (for the studied 
item) from false memory (for the critical item). Each 
list was separated by a visual prompt (‘NEW LIST’) 
for 3 s. The study phase took approximately 7 min and 
was followed by a simple math task as a filler task for 
3 min.  
Recognition test  
Prior to the recognition-test phase, the warning was 
repeated to remind participants in the warned group of 
the false-memory phenomenon and to strongly 
encourage them to avoid falsely recognizing critical 
items. The warning was not given to the unwarned 
group. In the recognition test, each test item was 
preceded by the fixation point for 300 ms, and 
participants were asked to decide whether the test 
word had been presented in the study phase (‘Old’) or 
not (‘New’). The test phase took approximately 3 min.  
Post-task affect manipulation check  
After the recognition test, all participants completed a 
funnel questionnaire, using a 9-point scale that was 
designed to check the post-task ratings of induced 
affect (pleasantness), arousal, perceived importance 
of the task, and enjoyment. The post-task check on 
induced affect was administered approximately 13 
min after the induction of positive affect, the duration 
of which falls within the typical time window for an 
induced effect to remain effective. Additional 
questions were included to probe participants’ 
awareness of the research hypotheses, suspicions 
about the study, and miscellaneous matters such as 
any previous experience or familiarity with the study.   
Results  
Affect manipulation check  
An independent-samples t-test of the mean number of 
correct items on the RAT showed that the positive-
affect group performed significantly better than the 
neutralaffect group, t(76) = 3.72, p < 0.01, Cohen’s d 
= 0.84. This result demonstrates that participants in 
the positiveaffect condition felt more pleasant than 
those in the control condition and that the method used 
to induce positive affect had been effective.  
An independent-samples t-test was performed on 
post-task ratings of induced affect (Table 1). 
Consistent with the result obtained from the RAT, we 
found that the positive-affect group still felt more 
pleasant than the neutral- affect group at the end of the 
task, t(76) = 2.39, p = 0.02, Cohen’s d = 0.54, but 
arousal differences did not emerge by the end of the 
task, t(76) = 1.42, p = 0.16. This suggests that the 
method for inducing positive affect was effective and 
that the induced mood persisted until the end of the 
study.  
Recognition  
A mixed-factor repeated-measures ANOVA by ITEM 
(list, critical), AFFECT (positive, neutral), and 
WARNING (warning, no warning) was performed on 
mean probability of recognition. We found two main 
effects of WARNING and ITEM. The main effect of 
WARNING was that the warned group (M = 60.8) 
showed significantly lower recognition rates than the 
unwarned group (M = 73), F(1, 74) = 23.1, p < 0.001, 
η2 = 0.14. The main effect of ITEM showed 
significantly greater true recognition for studied list 
items (M = 73.5) than false recognition for critical 
lures (M = 59.9), F(1, 74) = 21.03, p < 0.001, η2 = 
0.19. Given the literature that has typically shown 
comparable rates of recognition for both the list item 
and critical lure, the main effect of ITEM indicates 
enhanced monitoring, which signals the ability to 
differentiate the critical lure from the studied item. In 
addition, we found a significant interaction between 
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ITEM and WARNING, F(1, 74) = 11.0, p = 0.001, η2 
= 0.09, indicating that a warning moderated 
participants’ monitoring ability to distinguish the list 
item from the critical lure. Planned comparisons 
showed that the effect of ITEM (i.e. a monitoring 
ability) was significant in the warned group, t(39) = 
5.35, p < 0.001, but not in the unwarned group, t(37) 
= 0.87, p = 0.39, confirming that a warning 
significantly facilitates the ability to discriminate list 
items from critical lures. As expected, the ITEM x 
WARNING interaction was further qualified by a 
three-way interaction with AFFECT, F(1, 74) = 4.84, 
p = 0.03, η2 = 0.04. This three-way interaction 
between ITEM, WARNING, and AFFECT was 
further analyzed by separate two-way ANOVAs and 
planned comparisons, as discussed below.  
We pursued the three-way interaction by 
WARNING. In the warned group, the main effect of 
ITEM was significant, F(1, 38) = 29.7, p < 0.001, and 
significantly interacted with AFFECT, F(1, 38) = 
4.13, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.05, suggesting that AFFECT 
modulated monitoring abilities to tell list items from 
critical lures. Planned comparisons showed a 
significant difference between true recognition (for 
the list item) and false recognition (for the critical 
lure) in both affect conditions, but this effect was 
more pronounced in the positive-affect condition, 
t(20) = 5.59, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.03, than in the 
neutral-affect condition, t(18) = 2.29, p = 0.034, 
Cohen’s d = 0.74; note that the effect size of the 
former is approximately three times greater than that 
of the latter. Moreover, when the two affect groups 
were compared with respect to true and false 
recognition, we found no difference in true 
recognition, p = 0.55, but a significant group 
difference in false recognition, with substantially less 
false recognition in the positive-affect condition (M = 
42.5) than in the neutralaffect condition (M = 56.5), 
t(38) = −2.315, p = 0.026, Cohen’s d = −0.72. This 
suggests that the interaction between ITEM and 
AFFECT was driven by substantially reduced false 
recognition (i.e. recognition for the critical lure) in the 
positive-affect condition compared to the control 
condition – and, in turn, that the positive-affect group, 
compared to the control, apparently paid more 
attention to – or took greater advantage of – the 
warning instruction, which resulted in better 
discrimination between the presented list item and the 
nonpresented critical item (Gallo et al., 2001; McCabe 
& Smith, 2002). In the unwarned group, however, 
neither the main effect of ITEM nor the ITEM x 
AFFECT interaction was significant, p = 0.23, and p 
= 0.51, respectively, suggesting that true and false 
recognition were comparable, regardless of induced 
affect; participants in both affect groups were not able 
to discriminate the list item from the critical lure. 
Consistent with the literature, our planned 
comparisons showed that the two affect groups 
differed neither in true recognition, p = 0.13, nor in 
false recognition, p = 0.79.  
Finally, to examine a linear trend of reduction in 
false recognition across the groups, we conducted a 
linear contrast analysis in an ANOVA model, with a 
weight of 0 assigned to the two unwarned groups 
(positive, neutral) as a combined control group. A 
weight of −1 was assigned to the warned-positive 
group, and a weight of 1 to the warned-neutral group. 
The result of this contrast test was significant, F(2, 75) 
= 2.35, p = 0.02, η2 = 0.07, indicating a significant 
linear trend for reduced false memory across the 
groups, with the greatest reduction in the warned 
positive-affect group, followed by the warned neutral-
affect group and, lastly, by the unwarned groups. This 
suggests that when a warning was given, the positive-
affect group, compared to the other groups, apparently 
benefited the most from the warning, which is 
believed to promote monitoring or decision processes 
that diminish false memory (Figure 1).  
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Signal detection analysis  
Given our finding that the positive-affect group, 
which was warned, showed a significantly lower level 
of false recognition than the neutral-control group, we 
used signal detection theory to examine whether their 
recognition memory had been influenced by either 
discrimination sensitivity (A′) or response bias (B″). 
A′ scores ranged from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates poor 
discrimination between presented words and non-
presented critical words and 1 represents perfect 
discrimination. The B″ score indicates whether an 
individual displayed a response bias when making a 
recognition decision. A negative B″ score reflects 
conservative criteria (likely to say no), while a 
positive score reflects a liberal bias (likely to say yes). 
Independent-samples t-tests revealed significant 
group differences for sensitivity (A′), t(38) = 2.17, p 
= 0.03 suggesting that the positive-affect group in the 
warned condition was better able to discriminate list 
items from their associated critical lures than were 
their counterparts in the same warned condition (see 
Table 1). This may suggest further that the happy 
people in the warned group resorted to more rigorous 
monitoring. In terms of their response bias (B″), 
however, the two affect groups did not differ, t(38) = 
−0.124, p = 0.22. Further analysis showed that the two 
affect groups in the unwarned condition did not differ 
in either discrimination sensitivity or response bias. 
This suggests that our finding – that individuals who 
experienced both positive affect and warning had the 
lowest false recognition – can be explained by an 
enhanced ability to discriminate list items from 
critical lures (i.e. monitoring ability), but not by an 
overall criterion shift in the positive-affect condition.   
General discussion  
Our findings suggest that, with enhanced monitoring 
due to warning, positive affect reduces false memory. 
Given the literature that has demonstrated that such a 
reduction in false memory through warning can be 
attributed to monitoring processes during the 
encoding phase (for a review, see Gallo et al., 2001; 
McCabe & Smith, 2002), the most parsimonious 
explanation is that positive affect enhances 
participants’ capability to monitor encoding 
processes. Our findings can also be explained in 
alternative ways.  
First, item-specific processing – which involves 
encoding items by their distinctive perceptual features 
(Hege & Dodson, 2004) – can also play an important 
role in the reduction of false recognition. Given that a 
prior warning also entails item-specific processing 
(McCabe, Presmanes, Robertson, & Smith, 2004), it 
is possible that enhanced item-specific processing in 
a positive affect state can contribute to monitoring. 
Some might disagree that positive affect can facilitate 
item-specific processing even in the absence of 
perceptually distinctive features such as pictorial cues 
(Arndt & Reder, 2003; Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 
1999). The literature, however, suggests that reduced 
false memory by item-specific processing can also be 
achieved using non-perceptual attributes (Hunt, 1995; 
Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; McCabe et al., 2004). For 
example, McCabe et al. (2004) have demonstrated 
that a manipulation of encoding instructions can lead 
to item-specific reductions in false memories without 
perceptually distinctive features. It is plausible, 
therefore, that because they had been warned about 
intrusion effects, our positive-affect group may have 
engaged in item-specific processing by actively 
generating unique cues to rehearse presented list items 
distinctively, which could result in a rejection of non-
presented critical lures. In addition, it can be argued 
that if the positive-affect group had engaged in item-
specific encoding for presented items, true 
recognition should have been enhanced (which we did 
not find) because individual list items were encoded 
distinctively. The literature, however, suggests that 
the true-recognition measure in most DRM 
experiments is not a very sensitive measure of item-
specific processing because enhanced true recognition 
can occur not only by item-specific processing but 
also by relational processing (Hunt, 1993; McCabe et 
al., 2004). Storbeck and Clore (2005, 2011) have also 
demonstrated that item-specific processing – which 
was observed in the negative-affect condition – 
reduced false recognition in the DRM paradigm, but 
did not affect true recognition. Taken together, it is 
important to note that in a positive affect state, item-
specific processing can potentially be used 
concurrently with monitoring processes to reduce 
false memories (McCabe et al., 2004).  
Second, it is plausible that a set of higher order 
cognitive processes that are believed to underlie 
monitoring abilities can also attenuate false memory. 
For instance, recent studies have documented that 
attentional control or working memory capacity 
influence one’s susceptibility to false memory in the 
DRM paradigm primarily because of improved source 
monitoring (Leding, 2012; Figure 1. True memory (for 
the list item) and false memory (for the critical lure) are 
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shown as a function of induced affect (positive vs. neutral) 
and warning instructions (warned vs. unwarned). Standard 
errors of the mean are presented in T-bars. The Journal of 
Positive Psychology 201 Downloaded by [Singapore 
Management University] at 21:31 09 April 2016 
Peters et al., 2008). Therefore, it is also possible that 
either enhanced attentional control or working 
memory capacity – both of which are shown to 
improve in a positive-affect state (Carpenter et al., 
2013; Yang et al., 2013) – contribute to monitoring 
abilities that in turn help suppress false memories. 
Similarly, it is possible that positive affect’s 
facilitating effect on cognitive flexibility (Isen, 2008) 
– an ability to spontaneously restructure one’s 
knowledge in myriad ways – may cause a reduction in 
false recognition, especially when the warning 
encourages the participant to carefully attend to the 
specific relation between list items and critical items. 
For instance, Libby and Neisser (2001) have 
demonstrated that an awareness of the structural 
knowledge of the specific relation between list items 
and critical items in the DRM list reduces false 
memory by placing constraints on the way gist-based 
information is used during a memory test. Given that 
cognitive flexibility implicates the increased control 
of attention (e.g. Yang et al., 2013), it is possible that 
improved cognitive flexibility under positive affect 
has contributed to a reduction in false memory. 
Further investigation that aims to disentangle the 
influence of attentional control (or working memory 
capacity) from that of monitoring processing will 
have a potential to shed light on mechanisms 
underlying the role of positive affect in facilitating the 
effect of a warning.  
Together, our study contributes to the literature by 
demonstrating that even short-lived positive affect 
confers beneficial consequences on false memory, 
especially when vigilant monitoring is encouraged by 
warning. This finding is notable, in that individual 
differences in emotionality can regulate false memory 
as assessed by the DRM paradigm.  
False-memory theories  
False-memory theories that take a dual-process 
approach explain our findings rather neatly and 
provide a useful basis for interpreting the theoretical 
implications. First, the activation-monitoring 
framework contends that the critical lure is 
automatically activated, but subsequent monitoring 
processes can prevent its encoding resulting in a 
reduction in false memory (Gallo et al., 2001; 
Roediger et al., 2001). Along these lines, our findings 
suggest that with enhanced vigilance through 
warning, positive affect reduces false memory by 
exerting differential influences on various memorial 
processes. Second, the fuzzy-trace theory posits that 
two independent gistbased or verbatim-based 
representations are associated with different types of 
encodings: (a) relational encoding based on semantic 
processing or (b) item-specific encoding based on 
perceptual distinctiveness (Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, 
& Payne, 2002). The fuzzy-trace theory suggests that 
although positive affect increases the general 
tendency to encode DRM lists in terms of gist-based 
information, its reliance on verbatim-based 
information may facilitate item-specific processing 
and cause a reduction in false memory. Thus, in light 
of the fuzzy-trace theory, our results indicate that 
positive affect does not always increase false 
recognition – even if it facilitates gist-based or 
relational encoding – because of the possibility that 
positive affect could influence verbatim- based 
processes such as monitoring, item-specific encoding, 
or other attention-based controlling processes, either 
at encoding or retrieval.  
Theories on the effect of positive affect on cognitive 
processes  
Several theories have been proposed to account for the 
effect of positive emotion on cognitive performance. 
The first of these, the dopamine hypothesis, posits that 
positive affect should improve higher order cognitive 
processes, such as working memory or controlled 
attention because it is associated with the release of 
dopamine into brain areas, such as the prefrontal 
cortex and anterior cingulate, that are believed to 
contribute to high-order cognitive processes such as 
error monitoring (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994) 
or strategic memory search (Rosen & Engle, 1997). 
Given that these higher order processes may serve as 
cognitive resources to promote monitoring processes, 
our results are compatible with the dopamine 
hypothesis (see Ashby et al., 1999). Second, 
Fredrickson’s broaden-and-build theory (2001) holds 
that positive emotions broaden our momentary 
thought–action repertoires and build on enduring 
personal resources. The broaden-and-build theory, 
therefore, is also compatible with our findings, 
because positive affect would invoke adaptive actions 
and intellectual resources (e.g. executive control), 
especially when the warning allows participants to 
actively adapt to the needs of task situations.  
While our findings provide evidence in favor of 
these theoretical assertions, they cannot be readily 
explained by the third theory, the AAI theory, which 
contends that positive affect signals that the 
immediate environment is safe, and therefore 
heuristic and effortless processing ensues instead of 
detail-oriented systematic processing (e.g. Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983). It is notable, however, that Bless et al. 
(1996) argue that positive affect decreases neither 
cognitive capacity nor processing motivation in 
general. Specifically, in Bless et al.’s Experiment 2, 
the positive-affect group – despite having had more 
false memories than the negative-affect group – 
performed better on an unrelated secondary task than 
both the neutral and negative groups. In view of this, 
our findings can be reconciled with those of Bless et 
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al.’s, in that although participants in the positive 
condition relied on less taxing gist-based encoding 
(i.e. general knowledge) to remember the DRM 
words, they were at the same time able to take 
advantage of available resources to monitor for the 
non-presented critical lures. Moreover, in light of the 
AAI model, a warning could have posed a problem in 
the environment, and therefore participants handled 
the DRM task by adopting more systematic and detail-
oriented processing rather than heuristic processing. 
Specifically, it is possible that the warning may have 
actually caused the participants in the positive-affect 
condition to not use gist-based information and, 
instead, employ more systematic or item-specific 
encoding or a more controlled memory strategy.2 In 
turn, this heightened attention to item-specific details 
could have led to better performance.  
Limitations and future studies  
First, since we did not induce neutral affect in the 
neutral- affect condition (i.e. the non-induction 
condition), it is arguable whether our neutral-affect 
condition actually experienced neutral affect. Given 
that affective states can be characterized by major 
attributes, including valence (positive, neutral, 
negative) and arousal (high, low), our evidence 
suggests that participants in the neutral-affect 
condition experienced less specific and less intense 
affect than those in the positive-affect condition (Isen, 
2008). For example, in terms of valence, the RAT 
score (used as an index of experienced pleasantness) 
suggests that participants in the control condition felt 
less pleasant than those in the positive-affect 
condition. Our funnel questionnaire also consistently 
indicated that the neutral-affect group felt less 
pleasant (M = 5.05) than their counterparts (M = 
6.02). Moreover, in terms of self-reported arousal, the 
funnel questionnaire showed that the two affect 
conditions did not differ. Taken together, this suggests 
that the non-induction condition differed from the 
positive-affect condition in terms of the experienced 
valence (i.e. degree of pleasantness), but not in terms 
of arousal, which renders it an adequate comparison 
group for examining the effect of positive affect.  
In addition, it is worth noting whether our affect-
induction method induced specific positive emotions 
(e.g. gratitude) rather than general positive affect. 
Despite the possibility that the gift paradigm could 
have induced more specific positive emotion, it is 
notable that our affect-induction method (i.e. a small 
bag of hard candies) was designed to induce mildly 
positive affect, in particular, for the following two 
reasons. First, given the paltry value of the gift, 
participants may have felt a fleeting emotion (i.e. 
gratitude) that lasted only a few seconds. Specifically, 
since the participant was asked to put the gift away 
with their other belongings before the start of the 
study, it is plausible that the participant could have 
been distracted from a sense of gratitude, which is 
generally triggered by receiving something 
considered to be costly to provide, valuable, or 
altruistically offered (Wood, Froh, & Geraghty, 
2010). Second, we tried to minimize potential demand 
characteristics by ensuring that the participant would 
not eat the candy and associate it, during the session, 
with the purpose of the study. When we examined 
items on the funnel questionnaire that were included 
to gage participants’ awareness of the research 
hypotheses and suspicions about the study, we found 
no evidence that participants had linked the gift to any 
part of the study. Moreover, the same protocol, which 
had been used in other studies (Yang et al., 2013; 
Yang & Yang, 2014), was found to be effective in 
minimizing demand characteristics. It is less likely, 
therefore, that participants – at least, in our study – felt 
specific emotions (e.g. gratitude or contentment) as a 
result of the gift they received at the start of the study 
and tried to perform better.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this work, it is 
also debatable whether specific positive emotions 
(e.g. gratitude, contentment, or amusement) would be 
equally able to enhance the effect of a warning on 
false memory in the DRM paradigm. Notwithstanding 
the differential effects of those specific emotions that 
can be considered positive (but not positive-affect 
states), mild positive-affect states induced by various 
kinds of inductions have often been found to produce 
the same behavioral effects (for a review, see Isen, 
2008). That is, the literature suggests that regardless 
of the specific underlying emotion, mildly positive 
affect that is low in arousal and motivational approach 
likely exerts similar effects. In view of this, although 
the unexpected-gift paradigm we employed could 
have induced either gratitude or contentment, their 
effects would be similar – rather than dissimilar – to 
our current findings if such emotional states are low 
in both arousal and motivational approach (Gable & 
Harmon-Jones, 2008). We acknowledge, however, 
that overgeneralizing this observed effect to other 
general positive emotions with varying intensity and 
arousal should be avoided.  
Fourth, given the literature that suggests that 
negative affect is not simply the inverse of positive 
affect, but rather a separate entity (Watson & 
Tellegen, 1985), our conclusion that positive affect 
facilitates the effect of a warning on false memory 
should not be interpreted to suggest that negative 
affect would have either similar or differential effects 
on false memory. In addition, although our funnel 
questionnaire suggests that it was positive affect – not 
arousal – that facilitated the effect of a warning, we 
acknowledge the possibility that the participant’s self-
reported arousal, as assessed at the end of the study, 
was not necessarily the same throughout the study. 
Therefore, future studies should consider not only 
negative affect or varied positive emotions (e.g. 
gratitude or contentment), but also a potentially 
intricate interaction between affective states and 
arousal level over time.  
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Another caveat is that our findings may be less 
conclusive regarding whether the effect of positive 
affect and warning is due to encoding or retrieval, as 
our study was not designed for this purpose. We 
speculate, however, that since our warning 
instructions encouraged the participant to engage in 
vigilant monitoring, especially right from the start of 
the study period, the effect of positive affect and a 
warning could have been stronger during encoding 
than retrieval. Consistent with this, Storbeck and 
Clore (2005, 2011) also suggest that affective states 
(e.g. sadness) influence false memory through 
encoding processes and not retrieval processes. 
Further study is warranted, however, to clearly 
disentangle the specific memory process underlying 
the effect of positive affect and warning on false 
memory, specifically by independently manipulating 
the timing of affect induction and warning 
instructions.  
Finally, it is not certain whether our findings can 
be generalized to other forms of episodic false 
memories evidenced by a range of research 
paradigms. For instance, some researchers claim that 
the DRM paradigm is of little relevance to episodic 
false memory (Freyd & Gleaves, 1996), while others 
suggest a potential link. For example, women with 
posttraumatic stress disorder after childhood sexual 
abuse or those who report repressed memories have 
shown increased rates of false memories in the DRM 
paradigm (Bremner, Shobe, & Kihlstrom, 2000; 
Clancy, Schacter, McNally, & Pitman, 2000). 
Although these studies suggest that there may be a 
link between DRM phenomena and repressed 
memory, we acknowledge that generalizing our 
findings to a more general episodic type of false 
memory (i.e. eyewitness memory or suggestibility) 
should be undertaken with caution – especially since 
episodic memory often requires access to the context 
of and personal participation in an event, thereby 
implicating more complicated memory processes than 
the phenomenon of false memory assessed in the 
DRM paradigm (see Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 
1997). Further studies, therefore, are needed to 
establish such generalizability.   
Concluding remarks  
Our most significant finding is that in the DRM 
paradigm, when the condition includes a warning, 
positive affect reduces false memory by actively 
engaging in monitoring (or item-specific) processes to 
regulate automatic activation of related critical lures. 
This finding is notable in that individual differences 
in emotionality can regulate false memory, as 
assessed by the DRM paradigm. Although more 
research is needed to understand the mechanisms that 
underlie the relationship between false memory and 
positive affect, our study provides important practical 
implications, particularly for educational and clinical 
practices. Specifically, given that learning 
semantically related concepts or information requires 
the ability to deal with substantial interference, our 
findings suggest that positive affect may provide 
useful cognitive resources to better deal with such 
interference while facilitating efficient and accurate 
learning. Moreover, given that therapeutic 
interventions often elicit false memories, inducing 
positive affect and warning patients before they 
undergo such interventions might reduce their 
susceptibility to false memories.  
Our study provides theoretical insight into 
previous studies in which the effect of positive affect 
on false memory was examined without considering 
its impact on monitoring aspects (e.g. Bless et al., 
1996; Storbeck & Clore, 2005). In contrast, our 
findings demonstrate that the inclusion of a warning 
profoundly influences the impact of positive affect on 
false memory, changing how cognitive resources are 
used in support of cognitive activity. Given the 
significance of this finding for resolving competing 
positions in the literature, future studies should 
attempt to replicate it in other false-memory 
paradigms (e.g. the memory-implantation paradigm). 
Future research will also be needed to more fully 
explain the specific cognitive processing (i.e. item-
specific processing or monitoring) or memory 
strategies through which positive affect operates to 
suppress the occurrence of false memories.   
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Notes  
1. We acknowledge that a greater reliance on general 
knowledge structures may not necessarily be harmful, 
as it does not always entail strict reliance on rigid 
schemas. It is notable, however, that the effectiveness of 
general knowledge structures should be determined by 
whether these structures are pertinent to the primary 
task. Namely, if general knowledge structures directly 
relate to the primary task, such reliance would render 
the primary task less taxing and more rewarding (Bless 
& Fiedler, 2006). For instance, in terms of creativity, 
general knowledge structures can be beneficial or 
harmful. If the creativity task requires either fluency or 
flexibility – which are promoted by an associative mode 
that is useful for considering multiple domains – greater 
reliance on general knowledge structures can be 
beneficial (for a review, see Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). In 
contrast, if the creativity task demands innovation or 
originality – which are achieved by suppressing either 
routinized or schema-based modes – extensive reliance 
on general knowledge structures can be undesirable, 
because it may result in mental fixedness, cognitive 
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anchoring, or heightened focus on a particular domain-
specific knowledge, all of which would adversely affect 
creative performance.  
2. We thank the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this 
possibility.   
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